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According to the “Embodied Cognition” entry in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the three landmark texts in the 4E cognitive
science tradition are Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind, and Andy Clark’s Being
There. In my first section, I offer a phenomenological interpretation of
these three texts, identifying recuring affirmations of the figure of dance
alongside explicit marginalization of the practice of dance, perhaps in
part due to cognitive science’s overemphasis on cognition to the exclusion
of affect. In my second section, drawing on my previous interpretations
of proto-affect theorists (including Spinoza, Deleuze, and Fanon), I
channel this tension in 4E cognitive science into a dancing partnership
with human science psychology, suggesting three “choreographic
provocations” for therapeutic practice and psychological research,
namely (1) treating clients/subjects as dancers, (2) reimagining research
and therapy as improvised duets between practitioners and clients/
subjects, and (3) pursuing an ideal of freer movement and an emergent
flourishing singularity for clients/subjects. Finally, I reformulate these
three choreographic provocations in terms of my new theoretical
method of “dancing-with,” as well as the four psychological prerequisites
for flourishing posited by my figuration philosophy of dance.

Dancing-with Cognitive
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In 2012, a special issue of Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences was dedicated to
the topic of movement in general. Originally
intended to focus more narrowly on the art
of dance, the issue contains several essays
devoted to the latter, foremost among
which is the contribution by Maxine SheetsJohnstone. In response to the Call For Papers’
question as to the place for dance in contemporary cognitive science, Sheets-Johnstone
argues that cognitive science, “being largely
tethered to happenings in the brain,” thereby
“lacks foundational grounding in experience, specifically, the actual experience of
movement, which is to say in kinesthesia”
(Sheets-Johnstone 2012, p. 39). Several thinkers
in what has become known as 4E cognitive
science, however, would argue that these two
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attributes (namely, brain-dependence and
experience-relevance) are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they argue, a researcher
can quite easily be tethered to both brain and
world—or, better yet, free to move, or dance,
between the two.
According to the “Embodied Cognition”
entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, the three landmark books in
the history of this approach to cognitive
science are, in historical order, Lakoff and
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (2003);
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The
Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and
Human Experience (1992); and Andy Clark’s
Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World
Together Again (1998). On the one hand,
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the explicit attention devoted to the practice of dance in these seminal texts remains
minimal; on the other hand, all three texts
frequently invoke the figure of dance in arguing for the superiority of the 4E approach.
Due to the former fact, I am sympathetic
to many of the claims in Sheets-Johnstone’s
essay; but due to the latter fact, I think that
(contra Sheets-Johnstone) this lip-service
is powerful and important enough to hold
out hope for a meaningful dialogue between
cognitive science and dance. Or, if this is not
feasible within 4E cognitive science alone,
the prospects are bright for choreographing
a partnership between it and human science
psychology.
In my first section, I offer phenomenological readings of the three foundational
texts of 4E cognitive science, which reveal
a recurring pattern of what I call “danceresonance.” By the latter phrase, I mean words
(at the discrete levels of rhetoric, examples,
and concepts) that connote or are otherwise suggestive of dance (with “resonance”
intended, via its sonic overtones, to suggest
the musicality that has been inseparable from
dance for most of homosapiens’ history).
Despite this hypothetical openness to dance
at a discursive level, however, these 4E theorists nevertheless also explicitly marginalize
the practice of dance (perhaps in part due to
cognitive science’s overemphasis on cognition
to the exclusion of affect), creating a tension
between (a) its inattention to the practice
of dance and (b) its utilization of the figure
of dance. In my second section, drawing on
my previous interpretations of proto-affect
theorists (including Spinoza, Deleuze, and
Fanon; Hall, 2012; 2013; 2016; 2017; 2018;), I
attempt to channel this tension in 4E cognitive science into a dancing partnership with
human science psychology, suggesting three
“choreographic provocations” for psychological research and therapeutic practice, which
I then relate to my new interpretive method
of “dancing-with,” and the four prerequisites
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for ideal political flourishing posited by my
figuration of philosophy of dance.
Before going into these details, it might
help to give a rough definition of dance in the
present investigation. Elsewhere (Hall, 2012),
I have constructed a phenomenologically
based, historically informed new philosophy
of dance, called “figuration,” developed as
follows. First, I performed a phenomenological analysis of my own decades of dance and
choreographic experience to generate a small
cluster of concepts that could be considered
central aspects of dance. Second, I went back
to the canonical philosophers who neglected
dance and looked instead for these concepts in
their work. I termed these central constructs
or aspects of dance “Moves,” and named them
“positure,” “gesture,” “grace” and “resilience”
(it is the latter Move, incidentally, which features the proto-affect theorists Deleuze and
Fanon). Having thus constructed the four
Moves, I then applied them to what I term
the seven “families” of dance, namely “concert,” “folk” “societal,” “agonistic,” “celestial,”
and “discursive” dance. By “families” here,
I was attempting to channel Wittgenstein’s
concept of “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein,
1953); in this sense, there does not exist a
unified thing called “dance,” but instead a
family of phenomena which are meaningfully
related through a cluster of shared similarities. It is important to note, however, that
this list is provisional, and open to change as
communities of inquiry see fit.

Dancing with 4E Cognitive Scientists
My “discursive” dance (in figuration’s terms)
with these 4E cognitive scientists is based on
the position that cognitive science is, after
all, redeemable, but only to the extent that
it makes “adequacy to dance” a necessary
condition of its success. As my readings in
this section suggest, however, this move is
not one that they currently seem willing and
able to make, which means that my suggested
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partnership between 4E cognitive science
and human science psychology may be
a necessary first step in that direction. I
will proceed historically in this section,
beginning with the first classic text of 4E
cognitive science, Lakoff and Johnson’s
Metaphors We Live By.
The most important dance-resonance of
this founding text, on my reading, is the
fact that the authors’ explicit linkage of
conceptuality to metaphoricity (insofar
as it foregrounds the body and poetry)
relies implicitly on an analogous linkage of
non-dancing movement to dance (broadly
construed). In other words, if concepts for
Lakoff and Johnson are metaphoric like
poetry, then, insofar as “poetry in motion” is
a meaningful descriptor of dance, their analysis can be understood as enabling a kind of
dancing conceptuality.
Perhaps significantly in terms of this
latter point, the word “dance” appears explicitly on the very first pages of Metaphors We
Live By. After claiming that our “ordinary
conceptual system” is “fundamentally metaphoric in nature,” (p. 3) Lakoff and Johnson’s
first example of what they term a “metaphorical concept,” namely “ARGUMENT IS
WAR,” (p. 20) already includes the following
reference to dance: “Imagine a culture where
an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal
is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically
pleasing way” (p. 5).
Both ARGUMENT IS WAR and
ARGUMENT IS DANCE are what Lakoff
and Johnson call “structural metaphors,”
which are metaphors that structure one conceptual domain in terms of another (p. 14).
Another group of metaphors in their classification system, which are more strongly
dance-resonant than structural metaphors
per se, are “orientational metaphors.” The latter, they explain, (a) organize “a whole system

of concepts with respect to one another,”
(b) “give a concept a spatial orientation,”
and (c) “arise from the fact that we have
bodies of the sort we have and that function
as they do in our physical environment”
(p. 14). Dance, similarly, organizes multiple
concepts into a coherent whole, fine-tunes
one’s spatial orientation, and takes the forms
it does precisely because of the details of our
embodiment. For example, the orientational
metaphor “HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN”
derives, they claim, from the fact that drooping “posture typically goes along with sadness
and depression, erect posture with a positive
emotional state” (p. 15).
It is here, in the figure of human knowers
constructing metaphors from their creative
movements through the world, that I find the
strongest resonance with dance in Metaphors
We Live By, since this figure appears to be
a literal example of “poetry in motion.” If,
by contrast, they had only argued that all
concepts are metaphorical, without making
this additional, crucial, claim (namely that
all metaphors are experiential vis-à-vis particular forms of embodiment in particular
environments), then I would characterize
their analyses as merely poetic.
The upshot of this survey is that for
the first landmark text of 4E cognitive
science, Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors
We Live By, the fundamentally metaphoric
nature of cognition extends beyond verbal
language to nonverbal embodied language.
Put differently, thinking is not only essentially metaphoric (making all thinkers
poets), but since that metaphoric thinking
is grounded in bodily comportment, all
thinking is essentially dance-like as well
(making all thinkers dancers). Crucially,
this dancing happens for the most part
unconsciously,andisthusakindofintra-orinfrasubjective dance. In short, there are bodily
dances within the dancer that is the human
being. Dance happens at multiple ontological
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levels, crisscrossing the human subject in ways
that can be both undermining and empowering, depending on how much we understand
and embrace these dances.
As for Metaphors We Live By, so for
The Embodied Mind, dance is suggested
as early as its Introduction, in the authors’
discussion of how “we continuously circulate
back and forth” between “our bodies both as
physical structures and as lived, experiential structures” (Varela et al., 1992, p. XV). This
description connotes dance not only because
many dances involve circular repetition, but
also because dance is a privileged site of the
intersection of the body-as-thing and the
body-as-structured-experience. Already in
Chapter 1 of The Embodied Mind, this image
of the circle is repeated, in the claim that
“in reflection we find ourselves in a circle,”
which the authors then paraphrase as “an
entre-deux” of “self and world” (p. 3). Dance,
similarly, is itself often a literal entre-deux
between the two people in a partner dance.
This image of the circle recurs in
Chapter 2 in regard to the authors’ relating
Husserl’s account of the relationship between
phenomenology and the “life-world,” in that
he, too, was “haunted by the untraversed
steps of the fundamental circularity” (p. 18).
More specifically, although Husserl “tried
to break out of the circle by treating the
background [including the life-world] as
consisting essentially of representations,” this
implies that phenomenology’s (allegedly scientific) representations could contaminate
that background (p. 18). In other words, the
scientific objectivity of phenomenology’s
analysis of the lifeworld is always-already
compromised by the fact that traces of phenomenology’s own operations cocreate the
very world that phenomenology attempts to
discover.
To Husserl’s credit, however, he not
only recognizes this circularity problem,
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according to the authors, but also tries to
solve it (albeit counter-intuitively), namely
by claiming “both that the life-world is prior
to science and that our Western tradition
is unique because our life-world is permeated by science” (p. 18). Thus, according to
The Embodied Mind, Husserl “embraced
the peculiar thought that the phenomenologist could stand both inside and outside of
the life-world,” which the authors describe
as phenomenology’s “peculiar contortion”
(p. 18). Put differently (dancingly), Husserl
accepts the primacy of the dancing aspect of
human inquiry, and valorizes dance’s creative
torsions of human experience. Nevertheless,
despite Husserl’s therefore affirming a kind
of dancing comportment, The Embodied
Mind nevertheless ultimately rejects his
approach because the authors claim it is
exclusively theoretical.
Instead, The Embodied Mind prefers
an intertwining of theory and practice, as
exemplified in Buddhism, particularly in its
dance-resonant concept of “yoking.” The etymology of “yoke,” that is, refers to the binding
together of two beings for one purpose,
which is accomplished, in partner dance, by
the dance itself, which “yokes” the two dancers. Appropriately, the authors’ description
of yoking is also dance-resonant, in their
claim that its goal is to “develop habits in
which body and mind are fully coordinated,”
yielding a “mastery” which “is visible to
others—we easily recognize by its precision
and grace a gesture that is animated by full
awareness,” and “associate such mindfulness
with the actions of an expert such as an athlete
or a musician” (Varela et al., 1992, p. 28). Dance,
too, obviously (a) requires extensive coordination; (b) is a kind of visually accessible,
awareness-heightening, and graceful mastery;
and (c) could, in many cases, be understood
as a form of expertise at the intersection of
musical artistry and athleticism.
Similarly suggestive of dance is The
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Embodied Mind’s later discussion of “emergence,” which utilizes (a) dynamical systems
theory, with its concepts of (b) attractors and
(c) cellular automata. Dynamical Systems
theory, first, is a relatively new branch of
mathematics, the most famous subfield of
which is chaos theory (so named because
it concerns systems that are so dynamic
that their behavior appears completely
unpredictable). An “attractor” in Dynamical
Systems theory, second, is any state for which
a system seems to have a natural affinity (that
is, to which it seems “attracted”). And a cellular automaton, third, is “a simple unit that
receives inputs,” (namely 1 or 0), “from two
immediate neighbors and communicates its
internal state to the same immediate neighbors” (Varela et al., 1992, p. 89).

illuminated by cellular automata experiments as involving “learning by correlation”
and “learning by copying” (Varela et al., 1992,
p. 92). In the former type of learning, “the
system is presented with a whole series of
examples and is molded by it for future
encounters” (p. 92). A real-life example of
this type can be found on any social dance
floor, where the energies of various partners
and couples generate complex patterns of
intensity throughout the room. And in the
latter type of learning, also “known as ‘backpropagation’,” there is “a model that acts as an
active instructor,” like the method in dance
instruction, called “backleading,” wherein
a more experienced follower (traditionally
a woman) teaches a less experienced leader
(traditionally a man) (p. 92).

With these definitions in place, the
authors suggest a thought experiment built
around a chain of these cellular automata
that has been bent into a single ring or
“circular array,” the result of which looks
something like a candy bracelet (Varela et al.,
1992, p. 89). “This ring of cellular automata,”
they explain, “acquires a dynamics by starting at some random state and letting each
cell reach an updated state at each (discrete)
moment in time in a synchronous fashion”
(p. 89). What one finds in such an experiment
is that “even this simple, almost minimal
network has rich, self-organizing capacities”
(p. 89). One could think of this experiment
as describing the (figurative and literal)
unfolding of a circle dance (such as Contra),
in which each dancer enters a different
existential state (connected to their prior
experiences), and in which patterns emerge
from what one might call the existential
osmosis of dancers’ absorbing and imitating
each other’s energy.

The Embodied Mind’s account becomes
even more dance-resonant when it later
complicates its previous analyses with the
concepts of “structural coupling” and “natural
drift,” both of which are dance-resonant even
in name (Varela et al., 1992, p. 151). The authors
propose structural drift as an important
supplement to the concept of adaptation
(often considered by mainstream evolutionary biologists as the sole important factor
in evolution). More specifically, evolution,
in the authors’ view, proceeds not only via
organisms surviving by adapting to their
environments, but also via the “drift” produced by random variation/mutation (p. 188).
Or, put more critically, natural selection by
itself has trouble explaining the following
five phenomena: (1) linkage/pleiotropy, (2)
lifespan development, (3) random genetic
drift, (4) stasis, and (5) various proposed candidates for the basic unit on which natural
selection acts.

Also suggestive of dance in this application of Dynamic Systems theory is the
authors’ description of the “two major
classes of learning methods” that have been

It is in the authors’ detailed analyses of
the latter five phenomena that the danceresonant moments of this section appear.
First, regarding development, they refer
to “pattern formation and morphogenesis”
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as “highly constrained cellular choreographies” (Varela et al., 1992, p. 189, emphasis added).
Second, as for drift, there are two possible
“sources”: (a) “if a gene is actively selected,
it will bring along”—like a leader guiding a
follower in a social dance—“any others that
are close enough;” and (b) if the size of “a
biological population” remains constant
over a period of generations, then “its gene
and genotype frequencies will ‘drift’ from
generation to generation” (p.191). Moreover,
since “about 40 percent of the genome is
not expressed and is repetitive,” the authors
conclude that the “constraints of survival and
reproduction are far too weak to provide
an account of how structures develop and
change” (p. 194).
In response to the latter insights, the
authors then sketch an alternate approach
to evolution which features even more
dance-resonant moments. First, this “natural
drift” alterative entails a “switch from a prescriptive logic to a proscriptive one,” wherein
“what is not forbidden is allowed,” which is
suggestive of the ways that rules in (especially social) dance often work, since in both
cases creativity and diversity are thereby
facilitated (Varela et al., 1992, p. 195). Second,
the natural drift approach replaces “optimizing” with “satisficing,” a kind of making-do
reminiscent of the oft-repeated advice in
social dance circles to “fake it till you make
it” (p. 196). The authors also describe this
second implication as involving the concept
of bricolage, “the putting together of parts
and items in complicated arrays…simply
because they are possible,” wherein the question quickly becomes one of “how to prune
the multiplicity of viable trajectories that
exist at any given point” (p. 196). In dance,
similarly, choreography often begins with
simply trying to see what dancers’ various
body parts are capable of, after which the
dance instruction tends to focus on weeding
out the many undesirable variations generated thereby.
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The upshot of this survey of the second
landmark text of 4E cognitive science is
that the key to Lakoff and Johnsons’ dance
of cognition—at both the human and infrahuman level—is partnership. The human
performs a partner dance with the world,
and with its own body as object; the mind
dances with the body; theory dances with
practice; and cells and genes partner with
each other across lifespan, historical and
geological time. Crucially, these dancing partnerships are performances that are bottom-up,
autonomous, and even (one is even tempted
to say) “democratic.” There is no master choreographer, nor struggling pupil, but rather
two or more dancing entities or phenomena
that coordinate together on the spot, more
or less spontaneously. One does not dance
alone, and one does not exert total control
over one’s dancing partnerships. The more
this is understood and embraced, the more
the dancers involved will flourish.
As with both Metaphors We Live By
and The Embodied Mind, Andy Clark’s
Being There also implicates dance as early
as its Introduction. Clark first names dance
in Chapter 1, “Outing the Mind.” At the
beginning of a section (dancingly entitled
“The Robots’ Parade”), Clark introduces the
first in a long series of robot-study analyses,
his first two historical examples thereof are
the “animal-like robots (sometimes called
‘animats’)” named Elmer and Elsie. These
robots’ accomplishments include having
taught themselves to engage in what Clark
describes as “amusing, self-tracking ‘dancing’”
(Clark, 1998, p. 12).
Chapter 2 of Being There traces similar
insights about dancing interaction from the
field of developmental psychology, beginning
with the concept of “action loops.” Clark’s
first example of this phenomenon—his
description of which actually includes the
word “dance”—is the experience of assembling a jigsaw puzzle, in which we “make
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a rough mental determination and then
physically try out the piece to see if it will
fit,” and maybe also “physically rotate candidate pieces even before we try to fit them”
(Clark, 1998, p. 36). Jigsaw assembly, in other
words, is yet another example of “an intricate
and iterated dance in which ‘pure thought’
leads to actions which in turn change or
simplify the problems confronting ‘pure
thought’” (36, emphasis added).
The subsequent section of Chapter 2
deals with a central concept for the book,
namely Leo Vygotsky’s concept of “external
scaffolding,” which also possesses connections
to dance (Clark, 1998, p. 45). Two of Clark’s
first examples of this phenomenon, already
bordering on dance practices themselves,
are the activities of providing “support for
the first few faltering steps of a near-walker
and supporting a baby in water to allow
swimming movements” (p. 46). Much “like the
elasticity of muscles,” Clark explains, these
external supports “form a backdrop relative
to which the individual computational problems facing the child take shape” (p. 46). In
dance, similarly, the choreographer and the
partner function as external supports to help
the shape the dancer’s posture, gesture, and
other movements.
Think, for example, of the famous scene
from the film Dirty Dancing in which the
dance instructor teaches his new student
about the dance frame, tracing an imaginary
horizontal circle (formed by the connections
of hands, arms and shoulders) connecting
leader and follower in what is known as
the “closed position” of ballroom dance.
The imaginary two-dimensional plane that
is outlined by this tracing, I would suggest,
is comparable to the platforms supported
by the poles of scaffolding erected for the
purpose of painting a new building. To flesh
out this metaphor, perhaps choreography
and dance instruction constitutes a kind of
metaphorical scaffolding for the purposes of

“painting” graceful new movements onto the
body of the student.
In Chapter 6, “Emergence and
Explanation,” Clark turns to Dynamical
Systems theory for the same purpose as The
Embodied Mind did before him, to buttress
his account of 4E cognitive science. Also like
his predecessors, Clark does so in a dance-resonant way, which includes returning to their
central concept of emergence, illustrated
with several dance-resonant examples. Clark’s
criticism of these explanations of dancing
phenomena, however, is that they “are not
constrained to constitute detailed recipes for
building the kind of devices that they both
describe and explain” (Clark, 1998, p. 117). In
response to such criticisms, Clark observes,
some defenders of the theories in question
have elected to “attack the criterion itself,”
rejecting the idea that “real understanding requires ‘knowing how to build one’”
(p. 121). Clark argues, however, that this
defense “misses the point,” which is that “we
should understand something of how the
large-scale properties are rooted in the interactions of the parts” (p. 121).
My question here, however, is the following: what if, as in the case of dance, a
given “whole” really is more than “the sum
of its parts”? That is, perhaps the dance is
what makes the parts “parts” in the first
place (rather than the other way around).
Interestingly, Clark himself appears to gesture in this direction at the beginning of his
subsequent Chapter 7, “The Neuroscientific
Image.” The context here is Clark’s review of
a scientific study that concluded that a monkey’s “isolated digit [finger] movements” are
“the complex case, with ‘more rudimentary
synergies, such as those used to open and
close the whole hand’ as the basic adaptation”
(given that a monkey’s “primary need is to
grasp branches and swing”) (Clark, 1998, p. 131).
To make an analogy with dance, the monkeys’
(a) swinging would be like dancing (perhaps
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of the “swing” variety, pun irresistible), their
(b) opening and closing their hands would
be like doing specific moves in a dance, and
their (c) individual finger movements would
be like every non-dancing thing that humans
do with our bodies. What I am suggesting
is that we cannot “build” dance from the
ground up, or even understand dance by
trying to build it from scratch, because our
bodies, and the scientific experiments that
we design with them, are nothing other than
(later) permutations of our species’ millennialong dances with our environments.
In Chapter 8, “Being, Computing,
Representing,” one section is particularly full
of dance-resonant moments, which is unsurprising given its title, “Beating Time.” It begins
with Clark’s survey of the controversy (initiated by philosophers such as Varela) regarding
whether representational approaches can “do
justice to the crucial temporal dimensions
of real-world adaptive response” (Clark, 1998,
p. 160). His first example of such real-time
adaptation is “running to catch a moving
bus,” in which “there must be a delicate coupling between the temporal activity of” the
runner and the bus (p. 161). And what better
phrase could there be, to describe the core
of partner dance, than “delicate coupling”?
Cognitive scientists, however—rather than
conceding that what is involved in catching
a bus is an irreducible dance of would-be
passenger and vehicle—have stubbornly
clung to failed attempts at a representational
solution.
Some of the most popular tools
applied in this failing effort have been
“adaptive oscillators,” devices which produce
“periodic outputs all their own,” namely, electrical signals responsive to “incoming signals”
(Clark, 1998, p. 161). More specifically, he
explains, when such a device “detect[s] incoming signals, it fires (spikes) immediately and
alters its periodicity to bring it slightly more
in line with that of the incoming signals,”
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such that, “over time,” the oscillator will
“come to fire perfectly in phase with the
outputs” (p. 161). Or, as he elaborates—using
language that could have been borrowed
from a conversation about dance—“regular
signals” from the environment (of the adaptive oscillator) “cause the device to ‘pick up
rhythm’” (p. 162, emphasis added).
To his credit, Clark himself admits
that this oscillator-example is vulnerable to
anti-representational critiques as well (such
as those offered by The Embodied Mind),
specifically through “appeal to the presence
of continuous, mutually modulatory influences linking brain, body and world” (Clark,
1998, p. 163). One of Clark’s examples of
this continuous mutual modification makes
the connection between that concept and
dance explicit. It concerns “players in a jazz
trio, when improvising,” and jazz music is
foundational for multiple Western dances,
including ballroom, swing, Latin, tap, jazz
and hip-hop (p. 165). Although Clark introduces this example with the qualification
that such “continuous reciprocal causation” is
neither “a rare or exceptional case in human
problem solving,” jazz and its improvisatory
core are, on the contrary, (a) revolutionary
in the context of Western aesthetics, and (b)
not obviously common in other aspects of a
typical white Westerner’s experience today.
Unless, that is, one thinks about Clark’s
very next example, with which I conclude
this first section of the present investigation.
“Dancing,” he notes, like jazz improvisation,
“sometimes exhibit[s] the kind of mutually
modulatory dynamics which look to reward
a wider perspective than one that focuses on
one component and treats all the rest as mere
inputs and outputs” (Clark, 1998, p. 165). Put
differently, representational analyses always
imply a hierarchy consisting of a primary
thing and a secondary representation of that
primary thing, whereas in dance it often
seems impossible to meaningfully identify
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one dancer as the important part of the
dance and another dancer as merely a source
of, and (automatic) reaction to, the information from the first dancer. Instead, both
dancers often seem equally primary as causes
and effects of their dance.
The upshot of this survey of the third
and final landmark text of 4E cognitive
science is that for the dance of cognition (from Lakoff and Johnson), with its
ground-up autonomous partnerships (from
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch), the most
effective approach is for the more empowered and centrally-controlled partner in the
dance (such as the robot vis-à-vis its legs, the
adult supporting the baby trying to walk in
water, and the choreographer with a student
dancer) to empower the less empowered partner in the dance to freely move and generate
activity, responding as needed to coordinate
that motion with the more empowered partner. That is, the partner dance has always
already begun, so there is no need for (nor
benefit from) trying to start it from scratch,
nor for imposing a controlling, top-down
vision on the movements that arise from all
the bodies involved. The idea, instead, is to
become aware of the dance which we are
already dancing—or which is dancing us—
the dance that has danced us all since before
we were human, and perhaps will do so after
we are human no longer.

Dancing-with Practitioners
and Clients
Reviewing the above analyses, one can
distill from them three “choreographic provocations.” First, from Lakoff and Johnson’s
Metaphors We Live By, all psychological
practitioners, clients and research subjects
can be meaningfully understood as dancers.
This implies, chiefly, a creative artistry and
embodied grounding for both practitioner
and client/subject, on which grounds the
latter should be approached as a body-mind

seeking to perfect their artistry in the ongoing dance of existence. Second, from Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind,
practitioners and clients/subjects engaged in
therapeutic encounters and research should
be understood as engaged in a partner dance,
specifically a duet, or pas de deux (literally
“step of two”), over which dance neither partner has (nor should have) full, independent
control. And third, from Andy Clark’s Being
There, the most effective approach to therapeutic and research encounters is for the
practitioner to empower the client/subject,
allowing the latter the greatest possible freedom of movement and initiation, confining
the practitioner’s responses to creating interpreting “scaffolding” for emergent patterns
in the client/subject’s movement. This allows
the client/subject maximal relational autonomy within their own dance, unlocking its
transformative power.
Unfortunately, the 4E cognitive science
tradition on its own has been reluctant
to fully embrace such analyses and their
implications, perhaps in part due to its overemphasis on cognition and marginalization
of other aspects of embodiment that are
foregrounded by dance, including affect. For
example, Clark anxiously backpedals away
(vis-à-vis Varela, Thompson and Rosch) from
conceding enough importance to dance for it
to undermine the dance-inadequate concept
of representation that Clark nevertheless
defends. Overall, 4E cognitive science has
drawn on dance as a kind of ideal, while
exiling actual dance so far from cognitive
science’s center that dance cannot challenge
its scientific legitimacy.
Fortunately, the very dancing conceptuality noted above in this tradition can
be utilized to address this problem. In the
remainder of the present investigation, I
attempt to choreograph several new dancing
partnerships, to perform responses to the
above choreographic provocations, namely
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duets between (a) 4E cognitive scientists and
human science psychologists, (b) psychological practitioners and their therapeutic clients,
and (c) psychological practitioners and the
subjects of their research studies. This terminology is inspired by my own background
and training in Rogerian person-centered
therapy, as a crisis/suicide counselor and a
support group facilitator. I have modified
Roger’s original terminology (of “therapist”
and “client”) to encompass various mental
health workers (not just therapists) as well as
research psychologists and their subjects.
The model for these proposed partnerships is an interpretive method that I call
“dancing-with,” which emerged (including in
the Dynamical Systems sense of that word,
as deployed in The Embodied Mind and
Being There) from the process of writing the
first half of the present investigation, along
with multiple other articles inspired by the
figuration philosophy of dance (cited above).
In each case, I offered close readings of a
theorist through the lens of dance (from the
schools of French feminism, Africana critical
race theory, German Idealism, and analytic
philosophy of art), which generated the following pattern: (a) the theorist uses dance,
especially as a figure or metaphor, to refer to
the most valorized aspects of their theory and
the world, while (b) nevertheless marginalizing dance, especially as a concrete embodied
practice, on the grounds that it is trivial and
associated with the most denigrated people and aspects of the world. Deploying a
method inspired by Derridean deconstruction, however, one can strategically flip the
dichotomy dance/non-dance, and thereby
perceive how dancing aspects permeate the
entire theoretical text, invisibly sustaining its
structure. Embracing the latter understanding, finally, can help empower both social
justice and psychosocial flourishing, to which
I return below.
Defined formally, a given theorist X can
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be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist
Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s
historical communities, and also meaningful
and actionable (i.e., empowering social justice) for X and X’s historical communities.
In this pursuit, the method of dancing-with
involves both (1) a creative “torsion” of Y’s
thought (particularly in the direction of
unconscious, embodied and political factors
at work in Y’s texts), and (2) a resultant,
sympathetic torsion of X’s thought toward Y.
In other words, X and Y “meet in the middle,” like two dancers walking onto the dance
floor to explore the promise of a flourishing
artistic partnership. In this partnership, each
must attend to the way that political meanings are inscribed on the other’s raced/sexed/
etc. body, both to react maximally justly, and
to maximize the movement options that can
be brought into play.
It might be helpful to reframe the
method of dancing-with in terms of the
Latin social dance tradition of salsa, by which
the method was inspired, in part because
this emphasizes its affective and embodied
dimensions. Imagine, if you will, two strangers dancing together for the first time. Dancer
X approaches Dancer Y, gesturing toward
the dance floor, to which dancer Y perhaps
responds with a smiling nod of acceptance.
Imagine further, and here I blend the hypothetical with the real, that Dancer X is a 6’3’’,
180-lb, white cisman, while Dancer Y is a 5’2”,
100-lb, ciswoman of Indian descent. For X to
have a satisfying and effective dance with Y,
one issue they must negotiate is their height
difference, especially when X is performing
what are called “leads” in the discourse of
salsa—movements by the leader which both
indicate and initiate other sequences of dance
movements for both partners. Additionally,
both X and Y must be open to a wide range
of possibilities regarding each other’s background and circumstances. For example, for
all X initially knows, Y might be attending
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her first-ever Latin dance, or she might be
a professional instructor with fifteen years’
experience. For another example, there is
always the possibility (especially given the
diverse and multicultural makeup of many
salsa dance communities), that X and Y are
not both fluent in a common language. In
fact, the only safe assumptions which X and
Y can make are that, given that they have
embarked upon a dance together, both will
do their best to make that dance a positive
experience (if only for the sake of their own
individual satisfaction), and each will probably make at least some movements which are
unfamiliar and challenging to the other.
At this point, a reader might easily
misunderstand dancing-with to be a mere
restatement of a postmodern strategy
sometimes dubbed by critics “creative misinterpretation” (and often associated with
philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and
Michel Foucault). The difference between
dancing-with and the stereotypical postmodern theory, however, is that dancing-with
includes a specific, value-laden comportment.
More specifically, dancing-with presupposes
an ethical commitment to a comportment
of trust and sympathy with one’s theoretical
partners, grounded in the strategic positing,
by theorist X, that theorist Y shares X’s goal
of ideal psychological flourishing for everyone involved in the psychological practice.
This ethical commitment also derives in
part from the fact that dancing-with is modeled on the world of Latin social dance. For
any readers unfamiliar with that scene in the
U.S. today, amateur dancers gather, around
once or twice per week, at a bar, restaurant,
or nightclub, in an event usually lasting
around four hours, often referred to now
as a 'social'. Speaking as someone who has
belonged to many of these social Latin dance
communities over a twenty-year period, the
goal of these communities is to make these
dances flourish as much as possible, where
“flourishing” includes (but is not limited to)

large crowds, new people, a friendly atmosphere, and aesthetically satisfying dance
encounters. To achieve this flourishing, the
average dancer must give each of their partners the benefit of the doubt, and act as if
those partners are similarly motivated to
achieve this flourishing. The stakes for the
dancers, moreover, are quite high, in that all
are to some degree vulnerable—physically
and mentally—to their partners, any of
whom could cause injury, discomfort, and
feelings of rejection, unworthiness, etc. That
we are not deterred by these high stakes,
however, begins to suggest the scope of the
benefits—which fortunately can be exported
to the realm of psychological practice.
More precisely, dancing-with consists
of four virtuous powers, which psychological practitioner X posits in client/subject
Y, and which correspond to the ethical
commitment required of X. First, dancing-with requires moral imagination, for X
to imaginatively occupy Y’s embodied position to sympathize with Y’s ends. By “moral
imagination” here, I mean the systematic discipline of bracketing one’s moral judgment of
another until one has made a sustained effort
to imagine oneself occupying their sociohistorical position. (Crucial here are Hannah
Arendt’s interpretation of Kantian reflective judgment in the political sphere, and
Richard Wright’s conception of the necessary
pain involved in expanding the moral imagination, as discussed in Hall 2016 and 2018,
respectively). Second, dancing-with requires
courage, for X to understand Y against the
grain of present-day conventions and fads.
Third, dancing-with requires trust, for X to
believe that Y is willing and able to revise
their being-in-the-world given new truths
and obstacles. And finally, dancing-with
requires flexibility, for X to remain open to
the possibility that X, X’s professional communities, and even X’s entire era, might be
wrong.
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The first section of the present
investigation began as one such example of
dancing-with, namely the present author
(as a philosopher trained primarily in the
continental and pragmatist traditions)
dancing-with the more analytic-dominated
field of 4E cognitive science. In the original
process of constructing those interpretations,
I found myself becoming more sympathetic to
analytical philosophers’ creation of sub-concepts through analysis, or clear and precise
definitions. This resulted from my realization
that their multiplications and subdivisions
of concepts could be extended even further,
all the way to the logical extreme that one
might characterize as a promiscuous plurality of individual beings in the world. That
is, infinite analysis would asymptotically
approach one concept per entity. This phrase,
incidentally, might also be apt for a qualitatively-driven psychology such as that of
William James—for whom the best analysis is
arguably a singular painted portrait—as well
as for the ideal in human science psychology of both practitioner and client coming
to understand the client as a singular being
(rather than subsuming them under the necessarily imperfectly-fitting universals of the
DSM).
In other words, this dancing-with
helped me to see greater value and flexibility
in 4E cognitive science’s analytic methods,
and I am hopeful that my interpretations of
these three landmark texts have shown that
that there is more in their work than has yet
been utilized by either dance theorists or
psychologists. Put differently, I have tried to
show that they can be enticed to dance, even
if they might initially seem to have “two left
feet.” My assumption here is that all humans
possess, in part through our evolutionary
heritage, a latent desire to dance (in the
broadest sense, inclusive of spontaneous and
unscripted, full-bodied, joyous movement),
evidence for which includes the pervasiveness of dance in social, warm-blooded, and
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mammalian species, as well as in young
children.
To translate this point into more
concretely dancing terms, the life of psychological practice is like a social dance, at
which a maximal diversity of styles might
ideally be represented. But this diversity
would challenge each dancer-practitioner
to get comfortable with, and at least minimally competent in, as many of these styles
as possible. And in the latter process, each
dancer-practitioner would—albeit subtly,
and primarily unconsciously—be shaping
their own style in the direction of those
diverse other dancers who are learning that
style by dancing with them. For my part, I
am committed to discursively dancing with
as many different theoretical styles as possible, and continue to find those styles more
amenable to mine than I initially imagined,
and to find myself increasingly flexible and
adaptive in transmitting those styles to
others.
More generally, and zooming out from
the method of “dancing-with” to the figuration philosophy of dance on which it was
based, I have argued that figuration implies
four psychological and political prerequisites
for ideal flourishing, as indexed to its four
Moves, namely positure, gesture, grace, and
resilience. I will now, by way of conclusion,
briefly re-summarize these conditions for the
individual. First, positure suggests that the
individual is always in motion, and always in
tension, despite apparent calm and stability,
which means that individuals must always
pay attention to their evolving needs and
desires, especially at dramatic changes of
life such as puberty. In other words, individuals perpetually move and change, and
thus require a psychological preparedness
for change and capacity to adapt flexibly.
Second, gesture suggests that psychological
well-being is impossible without physical
well-being, and that the apparent foundation
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of the mind is built upon a complex and
dynamic system of tensions in the active
body. Thus, psychological health requires
physical health, which requires bodily stimulation and discipline. Third, grace suggests
that any situation in which the environment
is prevented from flowing through the individual, and vice versa, will ultimately result
in isolation and dysfunction, which entails
that psychologically supportive, evolving and
challenging environments must be provided
for the vulnerable and evolving individual.
That is, permeability to the environment is
beneficial, which means we must promote
environments with which fusion is desirable.
And finally, resilience suggests that repetition
is inevitable, and that what appears initially
as madness may be crucial to survival and
flourishing. Thus, cycles and patterns will
always be repeated, which requires a tolerance of repetition and compulsion per se
(though not, of course, tolerance of all specific
forms thereof).

followed by the four psychological prerequisites for ideal flourishing posited by my
figuration philosophy of dance. By way of
conclusion, I wish to extend an invitation
to the reader to dance-with me as well, and
thereby more fully embrace our shared dance
of philosophical and psychological practice.

To summarize, in the present investigation I have explored the foundational texts
of 4E cognitive science, discovering therein
a tension between a valorizing of the figure
of dance and the marginalizing of dance
practice. Regarding the former, these texts
suggest that all cognition is an emergent,
improvised partner dance, best facilitated
by the more empowered partner providing
the less empowered partner with scaffolding
for producing free movement and identifying emergent patterns therein. From this, I
derived three choreographic provocations
for psychological research and therapeutic
practice, involving treating subjects/clients
as dancers, research and therapy as improvised duets, and the ideal psychological
practical encounter as the facilitation of freer
movement and an emergent flourishing singularity for the client/subject. Finally, to help
activate these provocations in psychological
performance, I reframed them in terms of
my theoretical method of dancing-with,
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